From the notebook
Redacting personal data from logs and LLM prompts in Python: emails, CNICs, cards, IBANs and phone numbers
KYC and support systems leak personal data into logs and LLM prompts. A tested Python redactor with typed placeholders, a Luhn check so order numbers aren't mistaken for card numbers, and the phone-number pattern that redacted my test's order ID. Plus where redaction belongs and what regex can't catch.
Personal data spreads through logs and LLM prompts without anyone deciding to put it there: an error message includes the request body, a support summary pastes the customer’s email, a debugging line prints a document number. Redact it before it’s written or sent: match each kind of identifier and replace it with a typed placeholder such as [EMAIL] or [CNIC], so the text stays readable and you can still see what kind of data was there. Two lessons from testing my own redactor: a broad pattern produces false positives (my phone-number pattern redacted an order number), and card numbers need a Luhn check to tell them apart from other long numbers. Here’s the tested version and its limits.
The redactor
import re def luhn_ok(digits: str) -> bool: total = 0 for i, ch in enumerate(reversed(digits)): d = int(ch) if i % 2: d = d * 2 - 9 if d > 4 else d * 2 total += d return total % 10 == 0 PATTERNS = [ ("EMAIL", re.compile(r"[\w.+-]+@[\w-]+(?:\.[\w-]+)+")), ("CNIC", re.compile(r"\b\d{5}-\d{7}-\d\b")), ("IBAN", re.compile(r"\b[A-Z]{2}\d{2}(?: ?[A-Z0-9]{4}){3,7}(?: ?[A-Z0-9]{1,4})?\b")), ("CARD", re.compile(r"\b(?:\d[ -]?){12,18}\d\b")), ("PHONE", re.compile(r"\+\d{1,3}(?:[ -]?\d){7,12}\b|\b03\d{2}-?\d{7}\b")), # +international, or Pakistani 03XX ] def redact(text: str) -> str: """Replace personal data with typed placeholders. Card-like numbers are only redacted if they pass Luhn.""" for label, pattern in PATTERNS: def sub(m, label=label): if label == "CARD" and not luhn_ok(re.sub(r"\D", "", m.group())): return m.group() return f"[{label}]" text = pattern.sub(sub, text) return text
Order matters. The specific patterns (email, CNIC, IBAN) run before the generic digit patterns. Otherwise a CNIC such as 35202-1234567-1 could be partly consumed by the card or phone pattern, leaving fragments behind.
What the tests check
| Input | Output |
|---|---|
Customer ali@example.com uploaded CNIC 35202-1234567-1 | Customer [EMAIL] uploaded CNIC [CNIC] |
Card 4111 1111 1111 1111 declined | Card [CARD] declined |
Order 1234567812345678 shipped | unchanged: fails Luhn, not a card |
Payout to GB82 WEST 1234 5698 7654 32 failed | Payout to [IBAN] failed |
Call +92 300 1234567 after 5pm | Call [PHONE] after 5pm |
or 0300-1234567 | or [PHONE] |
Latency p95 was 1234 ms on 2026-11-20 | unchanged |
Request 7f9c2a10-55e1-4c3b-9d1a-0b6f3e2c8a77 ok | unchanged: request IDs stay usable |
My first phone pattern accepted any run of 10 to 16 digits with optional +, spaces and dashes. It redacted the order number as [PHONE], which would have made the logs useless for exactly the debugging they exist for. The fix is to be specific: international numbers must start with +, and local numbers must match a known national format (here Pakistan’s mobile 03XX-XXXXXXX). Bare digit runs are left alone. That’s a deliberate trade-off: a local number typed without a recognisable format gets through, and you add formats for the countries you serve. The Luhn rule works the same way for cards: one random number in ten passes Luhn, so it reduces false positives without eliminating them. The algorithm is explained in Luhn and IBAN check digits.
Where should redaction happen?
- In the logger, not at every call site. A logging filter or formatter that runs
redact()on every message catches the lines people forget about. Redact structured fields by name too (email,cnic,document_number), which is more reliable than matching values. - Before LLM calls. Summarising a support ticket doesn’t need the customer’s card number. Redacting before the prompt also keeps the data out of the provider’s logs, and makes prompt-injection leaks less damaging; see canary tokens for detecting prompt leaks.
- Not in the system of record. The KYC case itself needs the real document number. Redaction is for copies, logs and prompts, not for the data the business actually has to process.
What regex can’t catch
- Names and addresses. “Ali Ahmed, House 12, Street 4” has no fixed shape. That needs a named-entity recognition model, or better, not logging free text at all.
- Digits in other scripts. Python’s
\dmatches Urdu and Arabic digits (۳۵۲۰۲), but the same patterns in many other regex engines and log tools match only ASCII digits. Convert digits to ASCII before redacting, as in validating a Pakistani CNIC number. - Images and documents. A photo of an ID card in a log bucket is personal data too.
Treat the redactor as a safety net that reduces exposure, and keep the rule that personal data shouldn’t be logged in the first place.
Summary
- Redact logs and prompts with typed placeholders, so text stays readable.
- Run specific patterns first; confirm card numbers with Luhn.
- Make broad patterns (phone numbers) specific, or they eat IDs you need for debugging.
- Redact in the logger and before LLM calls, not in the system of record.
- Regex misses names, addresses and images: log less, as well as redacting.
Related: KYC vs AML vs KYB and request IDs in Node.js logs.
Part of the guide KYC and identity verification engineering, which puts related articles in reading order.